Bryan Norcross: Understanding and misunderstanding warnings for dangerous weather

Late on July 3 into early July 4, a dying complex of thunderstorms was re-energized by the extremely humid, tropical air over the Hill Country of Texas. The result we know - a catastrophic series of torrential downpours over the river basins that sprawl through the hilly terrain.

DEADLY FLOODS RAVAGE COMMUNITIES ACROSS 3 STATES, SPAWNING UNPRECEDENTED DEVASTATION

It was like pouring a pitcher of water into a funnel. The results were a disaster whose scope we don't yet fully understand.

The meteorological factors that caused this event were well anticipated, and the warning sequence from the National Weather Service (NWS) was about as good as it could have been - given the intrinsic chaotic nature of the atmosphere and the limitations of modern science.

So what went wrong? Surely we can't accept this scale of tragedy. Unraveling the event begins with understanding how the alerting and emergency management system should work.

1. The National Weather Service gives advanced notice that a weather pattern conducive to producing dangerous flooding COULD come together in the next few days.
2. If the anticipated combination of meteorological factors seems to be converging, the National Weather Service issues an alert a day or so in advance that the ODDS of dangerous weather HAVE INCREASED. The Flood Watch was issued on July 3.
3. If the convergence process continues and the odds of a dangerous event have reached a critical probability, the National Weather Service should issue a definitive alert that danger is approaching in short order. This was the Flash Flood Warning, which was issued at 1:14 AM on July 4.
4. If the danger is extreme, and the threat is imminent, a more urgent alert should be issued. This was the Flash Flood Emergency issued at 4:03 AM, which warned of "catastrophic flooding."

All of these alerts preceded the catastrophic wall of water that surged down the river.

This is the protocol, and the local National Weather Service offices serving the affected part of Texas executed it well. The system doesn't stop there, however.

BEFORE-AND-AFTER SATELLITE PHOTOS OF CAMP MYSTIC, KERR COUNTY SHOW DEVASTATION OF TEXAS FLOODS

Every community is covered by people who are responsible for planning and handling emergencies. They then take over and use the information the NWS provides.

On the ground, in the counties, communities, or in this case, the camps, someone should be responsible for monitoring the information coming from the National Weather Service and comparing that to the predetermined protocols that assure everyone's safety.

Perhaps after step #1 above (the heads up that there could be a problem), and certainly after step #2 (the Flood Watch), the responsible party should have notified individuals who could end up in harm's way that there was a possibility that an evacuation or other mitigation measures might be required.

At step #3, the Warning stage, action plans should be on a short trigger. The responsible parties should begin implementing some or all of their emergency procedures, depending on the risk level at their location.

At step #4, when the Flash Flood Emergency was issued, anybody who was not on high ground needed to be moved immediately.

SEARCH FOR OVER 170 MISSING TEXAS FLOOD VICTIMS CONTINUES AS RECOVERY BEGINS

This brings up the obvious question, who are the responsible parties? At a county level, there's an emergency manager. In Texas, the political leader is the county judge. They and their team should have an action plan that designates who the decision-maker is, even in the middle of the night on a holiday.

And at a more granular level, companies or individuals who manage camps, campgrounds, hotels, or other places that people gather should have designated a responsible party that is trained to understand the National Weather Service alerting protocol and the steps they should take when dangerous weather alerts are issued.

This system requires significant preplanning and training, of course. Obviously, there was a breakdown at the planning stage, the implementation stage, or more likely, there was a failure of imagination.

How often have we heard, "I've been here 30 years, and I've never had a problem," or something similar? It's natural for people to think, "It can't happen to me, my town, or my camp." But people who manage emergencies have to be able to imagine the worst. That's the job. It's easy to imagine that an inability to conceive that an extreme event could happen on their watch, in the middle of the night, on July 4 was a key component in the systemic failure that night.

Unfortunately, a version of this apparent misunderstanding of the threat, lack of sufficient planning, and/or failure to execute an adequate emergency plan happens too often. Hurricane Helene in Western North Carolina, Hurricane Ian in Fort Myers Beach, and Hurricane Sandy all come to mind. And obviously, there are many more storms and scenarios that we should learn from.

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A point of misunderstanding is often related to the probability that something bad will occur. How likely is a certain spot to flood, for example? FEMA provides maps that give us some idea.

You've probably heard about the FEMA 100-year flood maps. They are usually described as areas with a 1% chance of flooding, areas with a 1 in 100 chance of flooding, or something along those lines. But those descriptions are tragically misleading.

Understanding probabilities starts with the question, if there was a 10% chance - one chance out of 10 - that something bad will happen that could severely impact your family, would you take action to prevent it? Most people would say, absolutely yes. But suppose there was a 5% chance - 1 in 20 - what would you do? Most people would say, of course they would do whatever it takes.

At what percentage do you not take action if the threat is extreme and possibly deadly? The number is extremely small, right?

Well, a 100-year flood map tells you where there's a 1% chance of a flood this year. But over 10 years, the odds are about 10%. Over 20 years they're about 18%, and over 50 years about 40%. So if you look at the broader picture, the numbers are high and threatening, and detailed planning is obviously required to keep people safe.

And the current maps and odds do not take into account the excess moisture in the air in a warmer climate, which is exacerbated in Texas by the extra warm Gulf waters.

The other place that there’s confusion about probabilities is related to the dangerous-weather alerting process. In steps one through four above, the odds are increasing of an extreme event in the area being alerted at each level. The warning is issued when the odds reach a threshold where the imminence of the event and the consequences of inaction are dangerous. An "emergency" is a higher-odds warning.

The odds are never 100% everywhere that is warned, so some people always feel over alerted. The hope is, of course that people that get the warning and prepare for the worst are relieved when it doesn't happen. Unfortunately, humans don't always react that way.

KERRVILLE FLOODING SURVIVOR DESCRIBES HEARING ‘SCREAMING KIDS’ AS GUADALUPE RIVER RAGED

So what needs to be done? The idea has been floated that sirens and short text alerts would have solved the problem. There is no question that the more alerting mechanisms that are available, the better chance that fewer people will be severely impacted. But if you hear a siren or get a text, what do you do? You seek information. Where should I go? What should I do? How bad is it? And where would you get that information in the middle of the night?

The answer is a robust emergency communication system involving traditional media, social media, sirens, texts, and any other available channels. The little-used NOAA Weather Radio system and the barely acknowledged NextGen TV signals that cover most of the country are obvious vehicles to beef up and use to distribute weather warning and emergency instructions from local authorities.

In addition, and perhaps most importantly, we need a system that assigns responsibility to trained individuals that facilitate the implementation of a certified emergency plan.

Should that responsibility lie with government or with companies or managers that aggregate people in areas where they could face danger? The answer is that there has to be a responsibility tree that begins with government, but spreads through communities and facilities where people gather.

FEMA has a standard operating procedure for just about every part of emergency management except communicating with the public. Perhaps this horrific event will trigger an examination of that missing piece.

Successful emergency response will never be possible without a robust communication system dedicated to these infrequent but critical occasions when seconds count. A national communications framework with funding to support it would honor those lost in the Texas tragedy and serve every American in disasters to come.

Tropics stay quiet

Mid July is, on average, a quiet time in the tropics. This year is no exception. No development is expected through the middle of the month, at least.